Este artículo propone una discusión sobre la intersección entre la filosofía francesa contemporánea y el psicoanálisis, específicamente enfocada en el tema de la “singularidad” en psicoanálisis, destacando autores como Politzer, Foucault y, especialmente, Merleau-Ponty. Se trata de pensar de qué manera estos autores buscan encauzar el tema de la singularidad en Freud. El objetivo es determinar cómo se puede definir la singularidad con la que se encontró Freud en su trabajo clínico de escucha a los pacientes y en qué sentido (...) esta singularidad no se reduce a las formulaciones teóricas posteriormente desarrolladas por el psicoanalista en los términos de un sistema psíquico – y a las que Politzer denominó de abstractas. Se tiene en cuenta, muy especialmente, los esfuerzos de Merleau-Ponty de pensar la noción freudiana de singularidad en los términos de una nueva teoría, que se volvió conocida como teoría de la otredad, en la que el filósofo aproxima la singularidad a la noción de pulsión de muerte, anticipando lo que años más tarde Lacan llamaría “extimidad”. De donde se sigue la pregunta rectora de esta investigación: ¿qué es la singularidad en la clínica psicoanalítica y en qué sentido es posible que uno la escuche del otro sin someterla a una abstracción o saber impuesto como dispositivo? (shrink)

The present study proposes an investigation into the reasons why Merleau-Ponty recognizes, in Goldstein’s incorporation of the figure-ground notion from the Gestalt Psychology, the convergence between contemporary science and phenomenological philosophy. It is about understanding how, insofar as it reveals the power of centering that operates in the concreteness of the existence of organisms in the surroundings, the notion of figure-background corresponds to the phenomenological notion of operative intentionality. In the same way, it is a matter of showing in what (...) sense, as a form of operative intentionality, the power of centering of organisms does not need to be based on the presupposition of an “I think”. Keywords: Merleau-Ponty; Goldstein; Gestalt; organismic intentionality. (shrink)

RESUMO Trata o presente artigo de um estudo sobre o modo como Merleau-Ponty busca extrair, da teoria freudiana dos sonhos, consequências ontológicas concernentes à vinculação expressiva entre as diferentes dimensões da experiência onírica, especificamente sobre o papel dos restos diurnos na descarga da libido, na realização do simbolismo ou, o que é a mesma coisa, na conversão do simbolismo em algo narrativo e sensível, especificamente afetivo. Conforme se mostrará, para Merleau-Ponty, seja no sonho sonhado seja no sonho relatado podemos verificar, (...) entre a dimensão imaginária introduzida pelos restos diurnos, por um lado, e a dimensão simbólica expressa como significante esquecido, por outro; uma sorte de unidade sem coincidência, uma indivisão meramente expressiva. A pergunta deste artigo é ‒ do ponto de vista ontológico ‒ de que modo a indivisão expressiva entre o sonhado e o relatado dispensa o recurso à ideia de uma interioridade transparente? ABSTRACT This article deals with a study on how Merleau-Ponty seeks to extract, from Freud’s theory of dreams, ontological consequences concerning the expressive link between the different dimensions of the dream experience, specifically on the role of daytime remains in the discharge of libido, in realization of symbolism or, what is the same thing, in the conversion of symbolism into something narrative and sensitive, specifically affective. As it will be shown, for Merleau-Ponty, whether in the dreamed dream or in the reported dream, we can verify between the imaginary dimension introduced by the daytime remains, on the one hand; and the symbolic dimension expressed as a forgotten signifier, on the other; a sort of unity without coincidence, a merely expressive indivisibility. The question of this article is - from an ontological point of view - how does the expressive division between the dreamed and the reported dispense the recourse to the idea of a transparent interiority? (shrink)

In this article, my objective is to confront a structural reading with an ontological reading concerning the genesis and clinical interpretation of dreams, regarding the formal operators who guide both readings, highlighting their differences. Beyond the “symbolic operator” - tasked with explaining the formation of unconscious desires that the dream would fulfill - it is my purpose to discuss the difference how - in each reading - the “real operator” is employed. In both, the real is pointed out as what (...) would explain the emergence of anguish before which the dream would find a limit, leading the dreamer to awake. Therefore, according to each of the readings, the real concerns very different occurrences. And the question I intend to answer in this article is: how does each of these ways of understanding the real affect the comprehension of what anguish is in the dream field? In what sense, for Merleau-Ponty, can the dream be understood as a surreal passage? (shrink)

In this article I present and discuss a reading hypothesis, according to which, with the purpose of thinking about the genesis of meaning in the lived experience without needing, for that, to resort to the reflexive transparency expedient ensured by the idea of a pure self, Merleau-Ponty promotes a shift in the way of employing the Gestalt notion, which starts to be read from the unconscious drive Freudian theory. Interpreted from psychoanalysis, however, Gestalt's notion would no longer address the lived (...) from a descriptive point of view and would assume a dynamic point of view, which Merleau-Ponty (1964a, p. 165) will call ontological, which, in turn, it will influence the Merleau-Ponty appropriation of psychoanalysis. Beyond anthropology, psychoanalysis, as a gestalt (or ontological) reading of the way the lived is articulated, would become a form of philosophy (MERLEAU-PONTY, 1964a, p. 323), the presentation of Being as a process of differentiation between incarnated signifiers, which would configure a “primary symbolism”. And my greatest interest, with this hypothesis, is to measure to what extent, with this approaching strategy between gestalt and psychoanalytic operators, Merleau-Ponty manages to solve a problem that he himself faced in his way of understanding how it is possible to have singularity in a context of production of spontaneous and generic meanings wholes. This means asking: in what sense the notion of gestalt whole clarifies what is the intimacy that, for example, psychoanalysis believes it can hear from the people? (shrink)

A tese de Husserl - segundo a qual,os signos haveriamde encarnar nossos pensamentos - forneceuo ponto de partida ao projeto merleau-pontyanode restituição "filosófica" de nosso contato com omundo da percepção. Porquanto seriam gestosinstituídos por nosso corpo, os signos remeteriam a reflexãofilosófica à experiência sensível e, conseqüentemente,ao mundo da percepção revelado por essaexperiência. Mais do que isso, os signos esclareceriam a origemsensível dos pensamentos. O que acabaria porsuspender a própria tese fenomenológica de queos pensamentos seriam o desdobramento dosatos de uma consciência (...) pura. A interpretaçãomerleau-pontyana da teoria fenomenológica daexpressão mostrou que, tal como ôs pensamentos,a consciência de nós mesmos seria tributáriada experiência sensível. (shrink)